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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
JONES-HAMILTON CO. v. BEAZER 
MATERIALS: CHEMICAL SUPPLIER 
"ARRANGES" FOR CERCLA LIABILITY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Services, Inc. 
(J-HJ,1 the Ninth Circuit revisited the stormy seas of liability 
imposed under the authority of the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act2 (CERCLA or 
the Act). J-H forced the Ninth Circuit to grapple with a matter 
of first impression, the liability CERCLA imposes on a party ar-
ranging for the disposal of hazardous substances at a facility re-
quiring cleanup.3 The Ninth Circuit found Beazer's supplying 
hazardous raw materials to J-H for formulation into marketable 
products constituted a disposal arrangement for which CERCLA 
liability attached. In evaluating this issue, the Ninth Circuit 
bridged an apparent split on the issue between two other 
circuits.· 
Reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment 
for the chemical supplier also forced the Ninth Circuit to reas-
sess its holding in Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music Ltd./' which 
upheld the validity of indemnity agreements between parties lia-
1. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Serv., Inc., 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 
1992) (per Fletcher, J.; the other panel members were Goodwin, J., and Brunetti, J.), 
reh'g denied, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992). 
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq. (West 1989). 
3. J-H, 959 F.2d at 131. 
4. The decisions in issue were United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 
1373 (8th Cir. 1989), and Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 
155 (7th Cir. 1988). The divergence between these circuit judgments is discussed in sec-
tion F, infra. 
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ble under CERCLA.6 Mardan became the dominant interpreta-
tion of the effect of indemnity agreements on CERCLA liabil-
ity,7 but an alternative perspective has been applied by federal 
district courts in the Sixth Circuit.8 
A final issue addressed in this decision was the propriety, 
under California law, of awarding attorneys' fees for appellate 
costs incurred enforcing indemnity rights. In an earlier decision, 
the Ninth Circuit recognized a split of authority on the issue in 
state case law.9 Jones-Hamilton argued that a subsequent deci-
sion of a state appellate court clarified the matter to J-H's ad-
vantage. The Ninth Circuit found the cited authority was not 
controlling and followed its prior decision, partially upholding 
the awarding of attorneys' fees to Beazer. 
The pervasive presence of hazardous substances in contem-
porary industrial and commercial undertakings ensures a broad 
interest in the outcome of this appeal. This note evaluates the 
appropriateness of this appellate decision in reference to 
CERCLA's legislative history and the Act's development as re-
flected in recent case law. 
II. FACTS 
In 1970, J-H, a chemical formulator, entered into an agree-
ment with Wood Treating Chemicals Company, whose rights 
and liabilities were acquired by Beazer prior to the contract's 
termination in 1984.10 J-H agreed to formulate raw materials 
supplied by Beazer into wood preservation compounds, with 
Beazer retaining ownership of all materials and final products. 11 
The agreement incorporated an allowance of up to two percent 
6. In Mardan, the Ninth Circuit imposed the single limitation that both parties re-
main fully liable for any cost recovery action brought by a government agency despite 
any indemnity agreement between themselves. Id. at 1459. 
7. Jane DiRenzo Pigott & Zemeheret Bereket-Ab, Status of Indemnity Agreements 
Under CERCLA Section 107(e), 6 TOXICS L. REP. (BNA) 1351, 1352 (1992). 
8. See, e.g., CPC Int'I v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D. Mich. 1991); 
AM Int'I v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (discussed 
in some detail in section G, infra). 
9. Dewitt v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 719 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1983) (discussed in sec-
tion H, infra). 
10. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servo Inc., 959 F.2d 126, 127 (9th Cir. 
1992), reh'g denied, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992). 
11. Id. at 128. 
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loss by volume of material for spillage or shrinkage in any calen-
dar month and a provision whereby J-H indemnified Beazer 
against all costs resulting from J-H's failure to comply with fed-
eral, state and local laws.12 
An agent of Beazer was present at J-H's facility during the 
formulation process.13 The control or influence exercised over 
the formulation process by this agent was a matter of contention 
between the parties.14 
Prior to forming the agreement, J-H received a permit from 
the California Regional Water Quality Control Board (the 
Board), restricting the chemicals J-H could discharge into its 
waste water containment ponds.1G Two of the restricted chemi-
cals, for which CERCLA liability attaches,16 were among the raw 
materials provided by Beazer.17 
At the Board's direction, J-H incurred costs of up to two 
million dollars cleaning up the waste water containment ponds. IS 
Following the cleanup, J-H brought an action against Beazer for 
contribution under CERCLA19 in federal court in the Northern 
District of California.20 
J-H argued that an indemnity agreement between the par-
ties was counter to California public policy, was too limited in 
scope to apply to CERCLA liability, and was never intended to 
protect Beazer from the consequences of Beazer's own unlawful 
12.Id. 
13.Id. 
14. J-H, 959 F.2d at 130. J-H asserted that Beazer's agent directed the formulation 
process. Beazer contended that their agent only reviewed the process to ensure quality 
control of the final products. 
15.Id. 
16. Among the substances supplied by Beazer were pentachlorophenol and te-
trachlorophenol, both listed in 40 C.F.R. § 116.4 as regulated chemicals under the au-
thority of 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A), which is incorporated by reference into CERCLA's 
definition of hazardous substances. CERCLA section lOl(14); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (West 
Supp. 1992). 
17. J-H, 959 F.2d at 128. 
18.Id. 
19. Section 113(0; 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0 (authorizing a party incurring cleanup costs 
under CERCLA to claim a right of contribution from other liable parties). 
20. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd 
in part, rev'd in part sub nom., Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servo Inc., 959 
F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992). 
3
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acts.21 The authority cited for J-H's first argument, Widson v. 
International Harvester CO.;~2 concerned products liability. The 
district court held that though both CERCLA and California 
products liability law are strict liability regimes, the two were 
enacted by different legislative bodies and do not reflect identi-
cal public policies. laS Mardan was cited by the court as authoriz-
ing parties to allocate CERCLA liability among themselves 
through the bargaining process.24 The district court also rejected 
J-H's argument that the scope of the indemnity agreement did 
not extend to CERCLA liability. With special reference to the 
interpretation of indemnity agreements under California law, 
the court again cited Mardan to hold that an indemnity clause 
need not make specific reference to CERCLA-like claims as a 
condition for such claims falling within the agreement's scope of 
protection. lall 
J-H's argument that the agreement did not extend to envi-
ronmental response costs because CERCLA was not in existence 
at the time the contract was formed also failed to persuade the 
district court. Citing City of Torrance v. Workers Compo Ap-
peals Board26 as authority, the district court held that "when an 
instrument specifically refers to the law, it refers not simply to 
the law at the time at which the parties entered into the agree-
ment, but also the law at the time of enforcement."la7 The court 
emphasized that the Board's abatement order was issued under 
the authority of state law,28 not CERCLA, that this order would 
21. [d. at 1024. 
22. 200 Cal. Rptr. 136 (Cal. App. 1984). 
23. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1990). The 
court explained further: 
[d. at 1025. 
The California legislature has specifically provided that agree-
ments which seek to indemnify a party for strict products lia-
bility are "void and unenforceable" because they are "against 
public policy" (citations omitted). To determine the public 
policies which underlie CERCLA, however, the court need not 
and should not examine the pronouncements of the California 
legislature with respect to products liability, but rather must 
determine the intent of Congress as expressed in the language 
of CERCLA itself. 
24. [d. at 1026. 
25. [d. at 1027. 
26. 185 Cal. Rptr. 645 (Cal. App. 1982). 
27. Kop-Coat, 750 F. Supp. at 1028. 
28. CAL. WATER CODE § 13304 (Deering Supp. 1991). 
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have been issued regardless of the existence of CERCLA, and 
that the federal Act merely provided J-H a means by which to 
pursue a private action for cost recovery.29 
Without regard to any alleged acts of "active negligence" on 
Beazer's part, the district court granted Beazer's motion for 
summary judgment based on the indemnity agreement between 
the parties.30 A consideration such as an indemnitee's active 
negligence, the court stated, would only warrant evaluation if 
the indemnity protection claimed was implied rather than ex-
pressly granted.31 The issue of whether Beazer's supplying haz-
ardous substances to J-H's facility and the subsequent control of 
the formulation process could provide a basis for CERCLA lia-
bility was not addressed by the district court.32 Subsequently, J-
H appealed the summary judgment and the awarding of attor-
neys' fees to Beazer.33 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF CERCLA 
Since its enactment in 1980, CERCLA has been the subject 
of considerable criticism from courts and commentators.34 
[d. 
CLEANUP OR ABATEMENT ORDER; ENFORCEMENT; PROMPT OR IM-
MEDIATE ACTION. 
(a) Any person who has discharged or discharges waste into 
the waters of this state in violation of any waste discharge re-
quirement or other order or prohibition issued by a regional 
board or the state board, or who has caused or permitted, 
causes or permits, or threatens to cause or permit any waste to 
be discharged or deposited where it is, or probably will be dis-
charged into the waters of the state and creates, or threatens 
to create, a condition of pollution or nuisance, shall upon or-
der of the regional board clean up such waste or abate the ef-
fects thereof or, in the case of threatened pollution or nui-
sance, take other necessary remedial action. 
29. Kop-Coat, 750 F. Supp. at 1028. 
30. [d. at 1029. 
31. [d. 
32. [d. at 1024. 
33. J-H, 959 F.2d at 126. 
34. See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1533 (10th Cir. 1992) ("In keeping 
with its notorious lack of clarity, CERCLA leads us down a convoluted path .... "); 
Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989) ("It is not surprising that, as a hastily conceived and briefly 
5
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CERCLA was enacted to address perceived inadequacies in the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act36 (RCRA), which Con-
gress conceived as a regulatory tool to ensure the proper man-
agement of hazardous wastes.ss The legislation, however, failed 
to account for abandoned hazardous waste sites.37 Another defi-
ciency perceived in RCRA was the absence of a government 
funding source for addressing contaminated sites.38 RCRA relied 
exclusively on the availability of a financially responsible 
owner. 3D Congressional action was spurred by 1979 estimates of 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that from 30,000 to 
50,000 inactive hazardous waste sites existed throughout the 
United States, 1,000 to 2,000 of which were believed to present a 
serious risk to public health.40 
By enacting CERCLA, Congress intended to "establish a 
comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and 
control the vast problems with abandoned and inactive hazard-
ous waste disposal sites."4} The Act's purpose was to ensure a 
rapid recovery of government funds expended in cleanup efforts 
and to induce persons responsible for creating contaminated 
sites to clean them up voluntarily.42 To effect this purpose, the 
legislation created a strict liability federal cause of action which 
debated piece of legislation, CERCLA failed to address many important issues .... "); 
Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3rd Cir. 1988) ("CERCLA 
is not a paradigm of clarity or precision."); see also Chemical Waste Mgmt. v. Armstrong 
World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1293 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("[Ilt is debatable whether any 
provision of CERCLA is clear .... "). 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (West 1989). 
36. 94th Congress Wrap-Up: Much Accomplished, Many Issues Left for the 95th 
Congress, 7 ENVTL. L. REP. (BNA) 10005, 10008 (1977); see also The Environment -
The President's Message to the Congress, 7 ENVTL. L. REP. (BNA) 50057, 50059 (1977) 
("The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, passed in 1976, gave the Environmental 
Protection Agency the authority it needs to regulate hazardous wastes and to assure the 
safe disposal of other residues. "). 
37. H.R. No. 1016, 96th Congo 2d Sess., (1980), reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6125 (1980); see also Michael B. Hingerty, Property Owner Liability 
for Environmental Contamination in California, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 31, 61-62 (1987) 
("RCRA, which is intended to control hazardous waste from 'cradle to grave,' is a more 
focused piece of legislation than CERCLA. RCRA's primary concern is with active solid 
waste facilities rather than hidden environmental contamination."). 
38. H.R. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Seas., (1980), reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6125 (1980). 
39.Id. 
40. Id. at 6120. 
41. Id. at 6125. 
42. Id. at 6120. 
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courts have construed as applying to both active and abandoned 
sites.4s 
Under CERCLA, the President, usually acting througl}. the 
EPA Administrator, is authorized to take necessary remedial ac-
tions at inactive hazardous waste sites that present unreasonable 
risks to public health or the environment." The Act grants the 
President authority to order a responsible party to take remedial 
actions, establishes a cost recovery mechanism for government 
funds expended in the effort, and provides sanctions against a 
party refusing to comply with such orders.411 
The legislation created a so-called "Superfund" to finance 
cleanup operations.48 In common parlance, CERCLA is known 
as the federal "Superfund Act" in recognition of this funding 
mechanism.47 The Superfund is financed through a combination 
of appropriations, industry taxes, and cost recovery actions.'s 
CERCLA is recognized as a remedial statutory scheme ne-
cessitating a liberal construction by -interpreting courts.'9 The li-
ability imposed is not intended to be punitive.llo Among the 
Act's most important goals are the encouragement of voluntary 
43. See Chemical Waste Mgmt. v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (emphasizing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A),s inclusion of "abandoned" within 
the statutory definition of "owner or operator"). 
44. H.R. No. 1016, 96th Congo 2d Sess., (1980), reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN NEWS 6119, 6131 (1980). 
45. [d. at 6133; see. also 2 KENNETH A. MANASTER & DANIEL P. SELMI. CALIFORNIA 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND LAND USE PRACTICE, § 50.51(3) (Matthew Bender 1992) "Al-
though issuance of cleanup orders under CERCLA has to date been somewhat rare, the 
penalty for disobedience of such an order is severe - a fine of up to $25,000 per day of 
violation. Furthermore, pre-enforcement judicial review of a cleanup order is generally 
prohibited by CERCLA [Section 113(h»)."). 
46. Section 101(11); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(11) (West 1989). 
47. 2 KENNETH A. MANASTER & DANIEL P. SELMI. CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND LAND USE PRACTICE, § 50.51(1) (Matthew Bender 1992). 
48. [d. 
49. See, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc. 805 F.2d 1074, 
1081 (1st Cir. 1986) ("CERCLA is basically a remedial statute designed by Congress to 
protect and preserve public health and the environment. We are therefore obligated to 
construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustration of the beneficial legislative 
purposes. "). 
50. DiRenzo Pigott & Bereket-Ab, supra note 7, at 1355; see also Note, Develop-
ments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1537 (1986) ("The 
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cleanup efforts or, in the alternative, the reimbursement of gov-
ernment funds expended in addressing contaminated sites. In 
The EPA views inducing voluntary cleanup actions as its pri-
mary goal. II2 Courts applying CERCLA have cited two primary 
legislative purposes underlying the Act: to give governmental 
agencies the tools for prompt and effective responses to such 
problems and to force those responsible for creating the pollu-
tion to bear the costs of remedying the contamination. liS 
CERCLA was enacted as a last-minute compromise between 
three competing bills.1I4 The Act includes by reference within its 
statutory definition of hazardous substance a number of chemi-
cals regulated under other federal environmental laws at the 
time of its enactment.1I11 Courts have applied common law doc-
trine to fill gaps left in the Act's statutory framework. 1I6 
51. DiRenzo Pigott & Bereket-Ab, supra note 7 at 1355; see also H.R. No. 1016, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess., (1980) reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6132 
(1980) (emphasizing that the apportionment of costs among responsible parties will re-
sult in a more rapid cleanup response and preclude a party having to spend more funds 
to comply with a cleanup order than their ultimate liability would justify). 
52. Environmental Protection Agency Memorandum on Cost Recovery Action 
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(August 26, 1983), reprinted in 41 ENVTL. REP. Federal Laws (BNA) 2865 (1983) (EPA 
Memorandum). 
53. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (S.D. Ohio 
1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989); accord United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. 
Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982). 
54. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 365 n.8 (1986) (identifying the compet-
ing bills as H.R. 85, H.R. 7020 and S. 1480. The note provides a detailed description of 
the legislative process involved in integrating the three bills). 
[d. 
55. Section 101(14); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (West 1989), states, in pertinent part: 
(14) The term "hazardous substance" means (A) any sub-
stance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 
33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or sub-
stance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) 
any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified 
under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6921](but not including any waste 
the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act 
[42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Act of 
Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) 
of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under sec-
tion 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 7412], and (F) 
any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with 
respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant 
to section 2606 of Title 15. 
56. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3rd Cir. 
1988) ("The meager legislative history available indicates that Congress expected the 
8
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B. THE SCOPE OF CERCLA LIABILITY 
Courts have perceived the Act as "casting an exceedingly 
broad, strict-liability net."117 Facility owners,1I8 prior owners,1I9 
successor corporations,eo corporate officers who have been in a 
courts to develop a federal common law to supplement the statute."); see also, United 
States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (S.D. Ohio 1988), aff'd, 872 
F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Where the statutory language and legislative history of CER-
CLA are inconclusive and the legislative history shows that the common law was in-
tended to fill such gaps, the'common law is a proper source of guidance."). 
57. AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ohio 1990). 
Id. at.527. 
The scope of CERCLA liability serves to encourage private re-
medial initiative as to existing sites, to discourage careless dis-
position of toxic wastes, and not least, to ensure vigilance of 
those whose proximity to generators of toxic substances cre-
ates a potential for liability, who also occupy the most advan-
tageous positions from which to monitor these entities. 
58. New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). 
59. FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Minn. 1987); see also 
Nurad Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992) (imposing 
liability on an equitable owner who had possessed the property for a short time and 
never used the leaking underground tanks that caused the contamination problem). The 
court stated: 
We do not think, however, that the word "owned" is a word 
that admits of varying degrees. Such equitable considerations 
as the duration of ownership may well be relevant at a later 
stage of the proceedings when the district court allocates re-
sponse costs among the liable parties, but we reject any sug-
gestion that a short-term owner is somehow not an owner for 
purposes of [42 U.S.C. section] 9613(0(1). 
Id. at 844. The Nurad court emphasized that, "[A] defendant need not have exercised 
actual control of a facility to qualify as an operator under [section] 9607(a)(2), so long as 
the authority to control the facility was present." Id. at 840. 
60. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989). Celotex acquired the interests of a company that had 
sold a contaminated prope'rty to the plaintiff prior to Celotex's acquisition. Despite Celo-
tex's lack of operation or control of the contaminated facility, the court determined that 
corporate successors and survivors of corporate consolidations assume the debts and lia-
bilities of the predecessor company, including the predecessor company's CERCLA lia-
bility. The court stated, "The costs associated with cleanup must be absorbed some-
where .... Congressional intent supports the conclusion that, when choosing between the 
taxpayers or a successor corporation, the successor should bear the cost." Id. at 91-92. 
See also Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., No. 92-CV-
506, 1992 WL 359959 (E.D. Va. December 3, 1992) (extending CERCLA liability to the 
inheritor of a sole proprietorship named in a suit for contribution), but see United States 
v. Mexico Feed and Seed Co., No. 91-3085, 1992 WL 330397 (8th Cir. November 9th, 
1992) (overturning CERCLA liability imposed on a successor corporation where the de-
fendant and its predecessor were two distinct companies in competition with one another 
prior to the acquisition and where the predecessor failed to disclose the nature of its 
pending CERCLA liability prior to the transaction). In United States v. Fleet Factors 
Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991), CERCLA liabil-
9
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position to control waste disposal decisions,61 and those who 
have arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances at a 
given facility62 have confronted CERCLA liability. Courts read-
ily impose joint and several liability when more than one poten-
tially responsible party is involved and the contaminants for 
which each is responsible have commingled or cannot be ad-
dressed adequately on an individual basis.63 
Commentators ascribe numerous advantages to a broad in-
terpretation of CERCLA liability.64 Strict liability represents the 
best means of replenishing expended Superfund monies, encour-
aging the safer handling and disposal of wastes and facilitating 
the internalization of waste disposal costs within the industries 
that have reaped the financial benefits of using chemicals.66 This 
enterprise liability rationale has been upheld by courts and the 
ity was extended to a secured creditor with imputed authority to control the waste man-
agement practices of the debtor. The court stated; 
[A] secured creditor may incur [42 U.S.C.] Section 9607(a)(2) 
liability, without being an operator, by participating in the fi-
nancial management of a facility to a degree indicating a ca-
pacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous 
wastes. It is not necessary for the secured creditor to actually 
involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the facility in or-
der to be liable - although such conduct will certainly lead to 
the loss of the protection of the statutory exemption. Nor is it 
necessary for the secured creditor to participate in manage-
ment decisions relating to hazardous wastes. Rather, a secured 
creditor will be liable if its involvement with the management 
of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference 
that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so 
chooses. 
[d. at 1557-1558. Subsequent to Fleet Factors, the EPA issued a rule (57 Fed. Reg. 
18,344 (April 29, 1992) codified in 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100) pertaining to the lender liability 
exemption of CERCLA (42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (West 1989) ("Owner ... does not in-
clude a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, 
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest .... "). Under the 
EPA rule, participation in the management generally means that the holder is actually 
participating in the management or operational affairs of the debtor and does not extend 
to the mere capacity to exert influence. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(b). See also Kurt Burk-
holder, The Lender Liability Rule Under CERCLA, 7 NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 3 
(1992) (providing an in-depth discussion of the new EPA rule). 
6l. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823 
(W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) . 
. 62. New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. N.Y. 1984) . 
. 63. See, e.g., United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990). 
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EPA as comporting with the legislative intent underlying 
CERCLA.66 
The Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA) was ,enacted in 1986. It has been described as reaffirm-
ing the appropriateness of strict liability under CERCLA.67 
SARA accomplished this both explicitly, by embracing a deci-
sion imposing strict liability within the legislative history,68 and 
implicitly, by fashioning several narrow-gauge exemptions to the 
emerging strict liability regime reflected in the case law.69 
C. COST RECOVERY ACTIONS UNDER CERCLA 
CERCLA provides for recovery claims by either government 
agencies or private individuals who have incurred costs cleaning 
up contaminated sites.70 Recoverable costs include any "not in-
consistent with the National Contingency Plan"71 (NCP) for a 
66. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D. Ohio 1988), 
aff'd, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989). 
67. 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUB-' 
STANCES, § 8.13 West (1992). 
[d. 
68. United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp.,' 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
69. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.13. 
70. Section 107(a); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (West 1989). 
LIABILITY 
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and sub-
ject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this sec-
tion .....0 
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazard-
ous substance owned or operated any facility at which such 
hazardous substances were disposed of, 
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise 
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a trans-
porter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous 
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other 
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or 
operated by another party or entity and containing such haz-
ardous substances, and 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous 
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, in-
cineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which 
there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the in-
currence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be 
liable. . . . . 
71. Promulgated by the EPA, the National Contingency Plan (NCP) is a set of regu-
lations establishing procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous 
11
Byrne: Environmental Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
224 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:213 
government agency or Indian tribe claimant72 or any necessary 
costs incurred "consistent with the NCP" for private individu-
als.73 The significance of this distinction is that a government 
claimant need only document that its expenditures were not in-
consistent with the NCP,74 while private parties bear the burden 
of both pleading and proving consistency with the NCP.7Ii De-
spite the disadvantage private parties have in bringing CERCLA 
actions relative to government claimants, the private suit provi-
sions of the Act serve to promote settlements and thereby con-
serve the resources of the Superfund which alone is inadequate 
to address a problem of national scope.76 Hundreds of cost re-
covery actions have been filed since the Act's enactment in 
1980.77 
substances. The Plan is codified in 40 C.F.R. § 300; 47 FED. REG. 31,180 (July 16, 1982). 
72. Section 107(a)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(A) (West 1989) ("All costs of removal or 
remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe 
not inconsistent with the national contingency' plan; .... "). 
73. Section 107(a)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(B) (West 1989) ("Any other necessary 
costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency 
plan; .... "). 
74. EPA Memorandum, supra note 52, at 2864; Developments in the Law: Toxic 
Waste Litigation, supra note 64, at 1501. 
75. See County Line Investment Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1991) 
The court upheld the dismissal of a claim for contribution against a former owner of a 
contaminated landfill. The plaintiff's failure to provide an opportunity for public com-
ment on the response measures taken, as required by the NCP, negated any right to 
contribution from the former owner. In dicta, the court recognized the validity of an 
action seeking a declaratory right to contribution for future response costs, providing 
that such costs will be incurred in a manner consistent with the NCP. [d. at 1513. See 
also William B. Johnson, Application of Requirement in § 107(a) of Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (42 U.S.C.S. § 9607(a)) 
That Private Cost-Recovery Actions Be Consistent With The National Contingency 
Plan, 107 A.L.R. Fed. 563 (1992) (providing an in-depth discussion of the issue). 
76. MAN ASTER & SELMI, supra note 47, § 50.51(1) 
[TJhe Superfund is incapable of adequately addressing even 
the presently known waste sites. The $8.5 billion [fund availa-
ble J represents less than 3 percent of the $300 billion that 
some sources estimate the cleanup of these sites will cost. 
Rather, the Superfund is designed chiefly as a standby mecha-
nism in case a site is not addressed by those parties CERCLA 
designates as liable for the cleanup. 
[d. See also Michael B. Hingerty, Property Owner Liability for Environmental Contam-
ination in California, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 31, 34 (1987) ("Unfortunately, $8.5 billion will 
not put more than a modest dent in the contamination problem nationwide."); Develop-
ments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 64, at 1497 n.69 (emphasizing 
that government savings in private party cleanups are realized primarily through the 
reduction in administrative costs and the increased time value of Fund money). 
77. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.11(A) ("[BJillions of dollars in cleanup costs have 
changed hands and hundreds of billions of dollars in potential liabilities are rebounding 
12
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The elements of a CERCLA cost recovery action include: 
1) the contaminated site fits within the defi-
nition of facility as stated in Section 101; 
2) a release or threatened release of a hazard-
ous substance has occurred at the facility; 
3) the release or threatened release caused 
the claimant to incur response costs; and ' 
4) the defendant falls within at least one of 
the four categories of liable persons described in 
Section 107(a).78 
The cost recovery provisions of CERCLA may provide a 
means of relief in states where no comparable right is available 
under state law. The California Hazardous Substance Account 
Act79 is the state equivalent of CERCLA. This law however, does 
not provide for private cost recovery actions.so 
through the insurance system."). 
78. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir. 1989). 
79. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25300 et seq. (Deering 1988). 
80. DANIEL P. SELMI, & KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, § 
9.02(l)(C) (Clark, Boardman, Callaghan, 1991). As the district court assessing J-H's 
claim explained, CERCLA's private cost recovery right fills this gap. Kop-Coat, 750 F. 
Supp. at lO28. See also Michael B. Hingerty, Property Owner Liability for Environmen-
tal Contamination in California, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 31, 65 (1987) ("Unlike the federal 
Superfund, there is no private right of action under the California Superfund Law. This 
omission has minimal practical impact on [Potentially Responsible Parties) however, be-
cause the federal Superfund provides a response cost recovery right for any site cleaned 
up under the state law.") 
Hingerty's blanket statement fails to consider two significant features of the state 
law: the broader scope of materials falling within the definition of "hazardous substance" 
under the state law and that the authority of the state law can only be initiated by a 
government agency. Section 25363(e) of the 'state Health & Safety Code (Code) grants a 
right to persons incurring response costs to join other responsible parties or, in the alter-
native, to bring a subsequent claim for contribution against other responsible parties. 
However, the claimant's liability must arise from an abatement order issued by the state 
Department of Health Services under the authority of Section 25358.3 of the Code. 
The state act defines "hazardous substance" in Code Section 25316 which, in addi-
tion to the CERCLA definition, incorporates by reference Section 25117, the Code's defi-
nition of hazardous waste. Subsection (b) of Code Section 25117 states, "Hazardous 
waste includes, but is not limited to RCRA hazardous waste." It is therefore possible for 
liability under the state act to attach for environmental contamination not subject to 
CERCLA liability. The significance of this disparity between the state and the federal 
laws is that a potentially responsible party subject to liability only under the state act 
has no incentive to pursue a voluntary cleanup with the expectation of receiving contri-
bution from other responsible parties. Courts have recognized the value of this mecha-
nism as furthering the goals of CERCLA. See, e.g., County Line Investment Co. v. Tin-
ney, 937 F.2d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir. 1991). In his paper, Hingerty acknowledges the 
powerful force CERCLA's private cost recovery provision contributes toward achieving 
the Act's purpose by encouraging private environmental cleanups. See note 96 infra. 
13
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D. LIMITED STATUTORY DEFENSES UNDER CERCLA 
As have other portions of the Act, the provisions regarding 
statutory defensess1 have received their share of criticism. S2 
CERCLA's strict liability scheme leaves little room for defensive' 
maneuvering. The "third party defense,,,s3 identified as the only 
one that matters in a practical way,s. has been described as 
"nine parts loser."slI The greatest limitation to CERCLA's statu-
tory defenses is that they only apply if the intervening agent is 
the sole cause of the environmental harm.ss Efforts by defend-
ants to supplant the statutory defenses with those of an equita-
ble nature such as "caveat emptor"S7 or "unclean hands"ss have 
[d. 
81. Section 107(b); 42 U,S,C, § 9607(b) (West 1989) 
DEFENSES 
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section 
for a person otherwise liable who can establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the release or threat of release of 
a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom 
were caused solely by -
(1) an act of God; 
(2) an act of war; 
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee 
or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission 
occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing 
directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where the 
sole contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff 
and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by rail), if 
the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence 
that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous 
substance concerned, taking into consideration the character-
istics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts 
and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against fore-
seeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the con-
sequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or 
omissions; or 
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs. 
82. AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 527 (N.D. Ohio 
1990) ("The defenses given by Section 107(b) are as narrow as the liability provision is 
broad: .... "); see also RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.13(C) ("Defenses under CERCLA, 
like the rest of the Act, leave a great deal to imagination and taste."). 
83. Section 107(b)(3): 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3), see note 81 supra. 
84. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.13(3). 
85. [d. § 8.13(3)(a). 
86. [d.; see also United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 
546 (W.O. N.Y. 1988) (holding the third party defense unavailable to a defendant at 
least partially responsible for causing the contamination problem at Love Canal). 
87. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp. 851 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1988). 
88. Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
14
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met with limited success.89 One comment~tor points to the ab-
sence of a right to injunctive relief within Section 107 as disfa-
voring equitable defenses.9o Yet, some harmless equitable de-
fenses have been proposed as more than any judge could stand 
to ignore: res judicata, payment, or accord and satisfaction.91 In 
addition, a claimant who fails to satisfy one of the prima facie 
elements or who filed beyond the statutory limitation period 
would presumably find his or her suit to be fatally flawed. 92 
E. THE RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION UNDER CERCLA 
Though the Act's original framework did not explicitly pro-
vide for a right of contribution, Congress recognized that the ap-
portionment of costs among liable parties would best achieve the 
legislation's goals.93 In addition to the inherent unfairness of a 
party paying more than its proportionate share of cleanup costs, 
Congress believed that a more equitable distribution of costs 
would result in greater compliance with abatement orders.94 The 
Act originally allowed a party paying a disproportionate share of 
costs to claim reimbursement from the Superfund.96 To conserve 
89. See, e.g., Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 852, 857 (M.D. Pa. 
1988) (finding the equitable defense of laches available because CERCLA cost recovery 
actions are essentially equitable claims for restitution); see also Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. 
Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 804 F.2d 1454 
(9th Cir. 1986), but see MANASTER & SELMI, supra note 47, § 53.32 ("Even courts that 
have held that equitable defenses are not precluded by CERCLA have found alternative 
rationales for denying equitable defenses."). 
90. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.13(2) ("Unlike Section 106, Section 107 authorizes 
no injunctive relief, which suggests that the ghost of the chancellor is not close at 
hand."), but see New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 301 (N.D. N.Y. 1984) 
(recognizing that a CERCLA-based claim does not preclude injunctive relief if joined 
with pendent claims for which such relief is appropriate). 
91. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.13(3); MANASTER & SELMI, supra note 47, § 53.32 
("Equitable defenses are often allowed on the issue of damages, even when they do not 
relieve the defendants of liability."); see also United States v. Atlas Min. & Chern. Inc., 
797 F. Supp. 411, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (refusing to recognize equitable defenses to liabil-
ity but noting that such defenses may be relevant during the apportionment phase of a 
proceeding resolving contribution claims); accord Versatile Metals Inc. v. Union Corp., 
693 F. Supp. 1563, 1572 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
92. RODGERS, supra, note 67, § 8.13(3). 
93. H.R. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., (1980), reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONGo 
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6132 (1980). 
94. [d.; see also Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 64, 
at 1537 (arguing that a right of contribution secures the benefits of a larger defendant 
pool and therefore serves CERCLA's goals of fairness and efficiency). 
95. H.R. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., (1980), reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6132 (1980). 
15
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Superfund monies, courts recognized an implied right of private 
parties incurring response costs consistent with the NCP to 
bring claims for contribution against those with whom they 
shared CERCLA liability. 98 
The enactment of SARA in 1986 incorporated the right to 
bring an action in contribution explicitly within CERCLA's stat-
utory framework. 97 Courts are expected to use appropriate equi-
table considerations in allocating response costs among liable 
parties.98 This discretionary authority allows courts to consider 
the relative fault of joint parties in allocating liability, a consid-
eration irrelevant to the limited statutory defenses provided by 
Section 107(b).99 Courts use the flexibility granted by SARA to 
96. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 893 (E.D. N.C. 1985) (finding 
such a right in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)). CERCLA's provision for a private cause of action for 
cost recovery substantially increases the depth of the Act's effectiveness. See Michael B. 
Hingerty, Property Owner Liability for Environmental Contamination i~ California, 22 
U.S.F. L. REV. 31 (1987), which states: 
It is doubtful that the Environmental Protection Agency, with 
its national concerns and limited resources, would use the 
Superfund to clean up a site with only marginally hazardous 
amounts of contamination. However, a private right of action 
under CERCLA might be used to recover cleanup costs at 
more modestly contaminated sites cleaned up by private par-
ties. Private parties have frequently used the private right of 
action to recover the costs of cleaning up contaminated sites 
that did not appear on the federal priorities list. The possibil-
ity of such private actions gives practical import to the broad 
definition of CERCLA facilities, despite the unlikelihood of a 
government action at many of these facilities otherwise. 
Id. at 46. See also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3rd Cir. 1992) 
(upholding the validity of CERCLA recovery actions based on response costs incurred in 
addressing de minimis levels of environmental contamination). 
Id. 
97. Section 113(0(1); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (West 1989). 
98.Id. 
CONTRIBUTION 
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who 
is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title. 
Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section 
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be gov-
erned by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the 
court may allocate response costs among liable parties using 
such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. 
Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any per-
son to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil 
action under section 9606 or section 9607 of this title. 
99. AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 531 (N.D. Ohio 
1990). 
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incorporate the Gore Amendment factors100 into their cost allo-
cation decisions despite the exclusion of these considerations 
from the final legislation. 101 
A complicating factor in regards to a right of contribution is 
presented by Section 113(f)(2)102 of the Act, which precludes ob-
100. See United States v. A&F Materials Co. Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ohio 
1984) (providing an in-depth discussion of CERCLA's legislative history and the Gore 
Amendment incorporated into the House version of the bill in 1980). The Gore Amend-
ment was an effort to soften the perceived harshness of imposing joint and severalliabil-
ity on parties liable under CERCLA without regard to relative culpability. The Amend-
ment listed factors courts would consider in apportioning liability among parties. 
Included within these factors were: 
[d. at 1256. 
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contri-
bution to a discharge release or disposal of a hazardous waste 
can be distinguished; 
(ii) the amount of the hazardous waste involved; 
(iii) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved; 
(iv) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation, 
transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazard-
ous waste; 
(v) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to 
the hazardous waste concerned, taking into account the char-
acteristics of such hazardous waste; and 
(vi) the degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal, 
State, or local officials to prevent any harm to the public 
health or the environment. 
Despite its exclusion from the Senate version of the bill, courts apply the Gore 
Amendment factors under the authority of CERCLA section 113(0(1) which requires the 
apportionment of liability based on equitable considerations. ·Some states have explicitly 
incorporated the Gore Amendment factors within their versions of CERCLA. See, e.g., 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25356.3(c) (West 1992). 
101. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.13(B). 
102. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2) (West 1989): 
SETTLEMENT 
A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or 
a State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement 
shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding mat-
ters addressed in the settlement. Such settlement does not 
discharge any of the other potentially liable persons unless its 
terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the 
others by the amount of the settlement. 
(3) PERSONS NOT PARTY TO SETTLEMENT 
(A) If the United States or a State has obtained less than com-
plete relief from a person who has resolved its liability to the 
United States or the State in an administrative or judicially 
approved settlement, the United States or the State may bring 
an action against any person who has not so resolved its 
liability. 
(B) A person who has resolved its liability to the United 
17
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taining contribution from a party that enters a judicially ap-
proved settlement with either the EPA or a state. Presumably, 
such an agreement would arise only after an adequate level of 
cleanup was ensured. However, failing to coordinate with other 
interested parties in multi-party negotiations could result in an 
inequitable allocation of response cost liability. The advantages 
of this provision from the EPA's perspective are obvious. lOS Re-
sponsible parties have an incentive to settle quickly with the 
EPA as a means of protecting themselves against claims for con-
tribution.l04 In addition, the potential animosity between re-
sponsible parties may thwart efforts to coordinate settlement ne-
gotiation strategies. Whether or not the EPA obtains a tactical 
negotiating advantage from the situation, if administrative costs 
are reduced and cleanup measures proceed more rapidly, the 
agency's goals are achieved. loll 
F. ARRANGING FOR DISPOSAL UNDER CERCLA 
Section 107(a)(3)106 of the Act includes within the statutory 
definition of liable parties those who arrange for the disposal, 
Id. 
States or a State for some or all of a response action or for 
some or all of the costs of such action in an administrative or 
judicially approved settlement may seek contribution from 
any person who is not party to a settlement referred to in par-
agraph (2). 
103. Michael A. Brown, U.S. u. Alcan: A Crack in the Wall of Joint and Seuerable 
Liability, 24 CHEMICAL WASTE LITIG. REP. 306, 307 (1992) ("The steamroller effect on 
individual PRPs when other PRPs begin to settle creates a strong pressure to settle 
without reaching issues of proportionate liability. Volume and ability to pay become the 
only operative factors in these situations."). PRP is an acronym for "potentially respon-
sible party." ENVIRONMENTAL ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS, Execu-
tive Enterprises, Inc. (1989). 
104. Deuelopments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 64, at 1537. 
105. EPA Memorandum, supra note 52, at 2865. In Transtech Industries Inc. v. A & 
Z Septic Clean, No. 90-2578 (D. N.J. November 2, 1992), reported in, 23 ENV'T REP. 
(BNA) 1869 (1992), a group of CERCLA-liable private parties formed a consent decree 
in which a number of de minimis parties agreed to contribute to cleanup costs on the 
condition of receiving a covenant not-to-sue from the parties facing more extensive lia-
bility. De minimis parties are potentially responsible parties with a relatively small share 
of cleanup costs. Such parties however, often sustain substantial transaction costs, such 
as legal fees and technical consulting costs during settlement negotiations. The de 
minimis parties were dismissed from the pending cost recovery litigation and received a 
limited indemnity against claims brought by third parties. The agreement appears to 
mark the first time a Superfund consent decree has been reached without the assistance 
or participation of government environmental officials. 
106. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (West 1989). 
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treatment, or transportation of hazardous substances to any fa-
cility containing such substances. The Act's "arranger" provision 
is the result of legislative compromiselo7 and has drawn its share 
of criticism. lOS There appears to be nothing inherently unfair 
about holding those responsible for arranging the disposal of 
hazardous substances liable for any resulting harm.lo9 Asserting 
a lack of ownership or even possession of the materials will pro-
vide no defense to arranger liability.110 Courts have applied ar-
ranger liability against parties selecting a specific place or means 
of disposaP11 and against parties that contract for disposal ser-
vices ignorant of the ultimate disposal. site to be used.112 Ar-
[d. 
LIABILITY 
Any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arrimged 
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for 
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances 
owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or en-
tity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by 
another party or entity and containing such hazardous sub-
stances .... 
107. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 n.8 (8th Cir. 
1989). 
108. United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 871 (D. Del. 1989) 
("Congress did not, to say the least, leave the floodlights on to illuminate the trail to the 
intended meaning of arranger status and liability."); see also RODGERS, supra note 67, § 
8.12(C) ("Like other important terms in CERCLA, an 'arranger' is undefined in the Act, 
and the omission has drawn predictable criticism that Congress did not help the cause of 
interpretation by leaving the 'floodlights' on or by fashioning an instr~ctive legislative 
history. "). 
109. RODGERS, supra note 67, §8.12(C). 
110. [d. ("One suspects that somebody who steals a truck; and later throws out 
drums of waste found in the back, will make little headway by arguing that he didn't 
'own or possess' the wastes disposed of."). 
111. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co. Inc., 579 F. Supp. 
823, 849 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) (assigning personal liability 
to corporate officers who owned a controlling interest in the enterprise and possessed the 
authority to control the pollution-causing activities, discover discharges and take mea-
sures to abate any resulting damage). . 
112. United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. N.C. 1985) (finding the defend-
ant arranged for disposal by contracting with an unlicensed hauler, for less than market 
rates, and not inquiring as to the ultimate disposal location); but see United States v. 
Petersen Sand and Gravel, Inc., No. 91 C 5835, 1992 WL 293328 (N.D. Ill. October 7, 
1992) (finding no arrangement for disposal absent a showing that the defendant arranged 
for disposal to take place at the facility in question). 
The defendant in Petersen, an electrical utility, paid another company to dispose of 
its hazardous fly ash byproduct. Some segment of the fly ash was usable as raw material 
for incorporation into road-base products which the other party to the contract manufac-
tured. The contract was termed a "Disposal Agreement" and both parties recognized 
that a proportion of the materials supplied by the utility company would not be suitable 
for manufacturing purposes and would require disposal. The price charged for the dispo-
19
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ranger liability can attach to one who chooses a disposal facility, 
chooses a transporter, or by an even more remote decision that 
can predictably lead to the disposal of hazardous substances at a 
particular facility.ll3 
In New York v. General Electric CO./H the defendant's as-
sertion that used PCB-containingm oil sold to a drag strip was a 
useful product became mired in CERCLA's arranger liability 
provision. The defendant argued that the oil was sold "in the 
ordinary course of business, for use as they see fit. "116 The court 
focused on the defendant's knowledge, or imputed knowledge, 
that the drag strip would deposit the oil on the land surface for 
dust control purposes as a basis for characterizing the transac-
tion as an arrangement for disposal.ll7 The court was unim-
pressed by the defendant's argument that the drag strip did not 
constitute a "facility containing a hazardous substance" within 
the definition of Section 107(a)(3).118 Such an interpretation, the 
court recognized, would frustrate Congressional intent and pro-
vide an incentive for dumping hazardous wastes in virgin 
areas. 119 
sal service varied on the basis of the usable quality of fly ash supplied. [d. at *7. The 
court found the transaction was not an arrangement for disposal, as per CERCLA, be-
cause the supplier provided useful material for a manufacturing process, and did not 
arrange for the ultimate disposal at the contaminated facility. The court stated, "[S]eller 
liability for the later misuse by the buyer of useful but hazardous ingredients in a manu-
facturing process was not intended by CERCLA's authors; such liability would chill per-
missible manufacturing." [d. at *8. 
113. Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 64, at 1516. 
114. 592 F. Supp. 291 (W.D. N.Y. 1984). 
115. Polychlorinated Biphenyl, a general category of chemicals consisting of two 
joined aromatic carbon rings to which a number of chlorine atoms are bound. 
116. General Elec., 592 F. Supp. at 297. 
117. [d. 
118. [d. at 296; accord United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 895 (D.C. N.C. 
1985) (finding CERCLA's statutory definition of "facility" [42 U.S.C. § 9601(a)] suffi-
ciently broad to encompass the North Carolina roadside sites where disposal took place). 
119. General Elec., 592 F. Supp. at 296 n.9. See also MANASTER & SELMI, supra 
note 47, § 53.22(4)(b) stating: 
[d. 
Courts have uniformly held that, for liability to attach, the 
waste generator need not have selected the final disposal site 
for the waste or know the final disposal site for its substances. 
The rationale behind these cases may be that CERCLA should 
not allow waste generators to escape liability for lack of 
knowledge of the disposal site. Such a rule would award com-
panies for not keeping track of their waste disposal and for 
ignoring poor disposal practices. 
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Arranger liability was also found to apply in United States 
v. A & F Materials Co. (A&F).12O The A&F defendant sold used 
caustic oil to another company for use in an industrial process. 
The court found the transaction constituted an arrangement for 
disposal and declared the fact that the recipient paid the sup-
plier for the material irrelevant.12l The meaningful inquiry was 
"who decided to place the waste into the hands of the particular 
facility?"122 The court emphasized that this transaction was pre-
cisely the type of decision CERCLA was intended to regulate.128 
Federal case law demonstrates a readiness to attach 
CERCLA liability for even the passive disposal of hazardous 
substances. In Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, CO.,124 
the court relied on the definition of "disposal" published in the 
Code of Federal Regulations126 to find an arrangement for dispo-
sal when a property owner consciously decided to abandon un-
derground storage tanks containing hazardous substances.126 
The court refused to consider the defendant's argument that the 
"useful material'~ in the tanks was sold with the property to a 
subsequent owner.127 A similar holding is found in Sanford 
Street Local Development Corp. v. Textron, Inc.,128 where two 
120. 582 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Ill. 1984). 
121. [d. at 845. 
122. [d. 
123. [d. See also Santa Fe Pacific Realty Corp. v. United States, No. CIV. S-90-361 
EJG-JFM (E.D. Cal. July 16, 1992), reported in, 7 ToxlCs L. REP. (BNA) 361 (1992). A 
property owner brought a claim for cost recovery against the United States government 
based on expenses incurred disposing of a large accumulation of hazardous substances by 
a sublessee. The hazardous substances had been purchased at an auction sponsored by 
the Defense Property Disposal Service, which at one time auctioned mixed lots, typically 
including solvents, coatings, adhesives, batteries, anodes and corrosive cleaning com-
pounds. The plaintiff claimed the government thereby arranged for the disposal of these 
materials. Admitting no issue of law or fact, the parties agreed to a settlement where the 
government paid $854,000 to the plaintiff and assumed responsibility for the disposal of 
a remaining drum of hazardous waste. 
124. 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992). 
125. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (defining waste as any discarded material or material that has 
been abandoned). 
126. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 847; contra United States v. Petersen Sand and Gravel, 
Inc., No. 91 C 5835, 1992 WL 293328 (N.D. Ill. October 7, 1992) (arguing that the passive 
release of a hazardous substance does not constitute a disposal as per the statutory defi-
nitions of CERCLA or RCRA). 
127. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 8472 (The court stated, "A defendant who has abandoned 
hazardous materials at a site cannot escape CERCLA liability by simply labelling a sub-
sequent transfer of the property as a 'sale of the hazardous waste.' "). 
128. 768 F. Supp. 1218 (W.O. Mich. 1991). 
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previous owners were found to have arranged for the disposal of 
PCB-containing129 transformers in a facility by means of a prop-
erty sales transaction.130 The court cited the defendants' recog-
nition of the disposal costs involved, efforts to salvage useful fix-
tures from the property prior to the sale and selling the property 
for a fraction of its market value as factors indicating an ar-
rangement for disposal.13l 
The Eighth Circuit fused arranger and enterprise liability to 
construct an all-encompassing theory of liability in United 
States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp.132 The circuit 
court's holding in this case has been described as "one of the 
more radical arguments for product responsibility ever advanced 
in the history of environmental law. "133 The defendants, an as-
sortment of pesticide manufacturers, contracted with the same 
formulator to prepare market-grade products. The manufactur-. 
ers retained ownership of the·materials throughout the formula-
tion process as well as the final products. The defendants re-
ceived no protection from their asserted lack of control over the 
formulation process and were found to have arranged for the 
disposal of hazardous substances. 184 
The Aceto court based its holding on common law doc-
trine136 and interpretation of the statutory definitions provided 
in the Act.13G The district court held that requiring an intent to 
dispose as a condition for assigning liability was contrary to the 
129. See supra note 115. 
130. Textron, 768 F. Supp. at 1222-23. 
131. [d. See also States v. BFG Electroplating and Mfg. Co., 31 ENVTL. REP. CASES 
(BNA) 1174 (W.O. Pa. 1989) (finding an arrangement for disposal in the sale of cinder 
blocks contaminated with heavy metals). The blocks had been contaminated due to 
chemical spills taking place over a prolonged period of time. The defendant had removed 
the blocks in order to address the contaminated soil beneath the blocks. 
132. 699 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D. Iowa 1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989). 
133. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.12(C). 
134. Aceto, 699 F. Supp. at 1390. 
135. [d. 1389 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427A (1965». The 
court construed the parties to have been engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity. In 
justifying its reliance on common law doctrine the district court stated, "The Restate-
ment provisions provide meaningful standards for resolving liability questions from the 
common law, the source which the sponsors of CERCLA considered appropriate for de-
ciding questions Congress did not resolve in the Act itself." [d. at 1390. 
136. Aceto, 699 F. Supp. at 1388 ("The legislative history of CERCLA is 'sparse and 
generally uninformative' with regard to specific questions concerning the interpretation 
of the Act's terms."). 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 16
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/16
1993] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 235 
Congressional purpose in enacting CERCLA.137 To the Aceto 
court, engaging in an enterprise in which the generation of haz-
ardous waste is an inherent risk is a sufficient basis for assigning 
CERCLA liability.ls8 
However, though expansive in scope, CERCLA arranger lia-
bility is not endless. lsB The A&F court distinguished its holding 
from that of United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,140 
where arranger liability did not attach. The Westinghouse plain-
tiff brought an action for contribution against the manufacturer 
of PCBS141 used in electrical transformers. The plaintiff disposed 
of the transformers at the end of their commercial life and faced 
CERCLA liability stemming from the cleanup of the disposal 
site. The court held that the plaintiff, not the manufacturer, 
chose the place and means of disposal and possessed no right to 
contribution from the manufacturer.142 
In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp.,l'S the 
Eleventh Circuit assessed facts similar to those in Westinghouse 
and reached the same conclusion.14' These decisions stand for 
the proposition that the manufacturer of a product that will 
eventually require disposal as a hazardous waste is not arranging 
such disposal by placing the product into the stream of com-
merce.14& Courts are unwilling to assign arranger liability absent 
[d. 
137. The court explained: 
138. [d. 
In the literal sense, an arrangement seldom occurs accidently . 
. . (Al definition - which would find an arrangement for dis· 
posal only if disposal of wastes was the desired result - fo-
cuses the Court's attention on the defendant's motives. This 
approach would be out of place in a regulatory scheme which 
is concerned primarily with what actually occurred rather than 
what was intended to occur ... (Tlhe Court believes that an 
arrangement based on acquiescence to certain inevitable ef-
fects can be considered an arrangement for such effects. 
139. A&F, 582 F. Supp. at 845 ("(Ilt ends with that party who both owned the haz-
ardous waste and made the crucial decision how it would be disposed of or treated, and 
by whom."). 
140. 22 ENVTL. REP. CASES (BNA) 1230 (S.D. Ind. 1983). 
141. See supra note 115. 
142. Westinghouse, 22 ENVTL. REP. 9ASES (BNA) at 1233. 
143. 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990). 
144. [d. at 1319. 
145. [d. at 1318 (rejecting a per se rule regarding a manufacturer's liability under 
CERCLA); see also General Electric Co. v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281 (2d 
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some affirmative act on the defendant's part, from which a ma-
terial benefit is derived, that leads directly to the disposal 
decision.146 
In Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials CO.,147 
the Seventh Circuit found no arrangement for disposal when a 
chemical supplier provided raw materials for formulation into 
marketable products. Vulcan Materials, the chemical supplier, 
did not retain ownership of the final products which were mar-
keted under Vulcan's trademark. I48 The supplier designed the 
formulation plant, instructed the formulator's employees in the 
operation of the facility, and, to protect its trademark interest, 
had a right of entry to the facility to observe the formulation 
process. The Seventh Circuit, though recognizing the public pol-
icy interest imposing CERCLA liability would instill in the mar-
ketplace,149 found the chemical supplier met none of the statuto-
rily defined categories subject to liability under the Act. IIIO 
Unlike the Eighth Circuit in Aceto and other courts interpreting 
CERCLA,1II1 the Seventh Circuit refused to incorporate common 
Cir. 1992) (finding the sale of virgin motor oil to gasoline stations is an inadequate basis 
on which to impose arranger liability for the eventual disposal of waste oil). 
146. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.12(C); see also Jordan v. Southern Wood Pied-
mont Co., Nos. CV191-108, CV191-063, 1992 WL 232362 (S.D. Ga. 1992) (refusing to 
perceive an arrangement for disposal when a chemical manufacturer, as required by fed-
eral law, supplies Material Safety Data Sheets with products to customers and encour-
ages customer inquiries regarding the proper means of disposing of chemical products). 
The court stated: 
[d. at *3-*4. 
[T)he imposition of liability upon a manufacturer on account 
of its dissemination of safety-related information is 
anathematic, even to the broad and salutary remedial pur-
poses of CERCLA. . . [To impose arranger liability for such 
efforts) would discourage chemical manufacturers from offer-
ing expertise to those experiencing problems and thereby in-
crease the risk of future hazardous waste incidents. Such a re-
sult is decidedly contrary to the intent of CERCLA. 
147. 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988). 
148. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 861 F.2d at 158. 
149. [d. at 157 ("The prospect of liability under CERCLA would induce Ii firm in 
[the defendant's) position to take greater care in design, construction and training, all of 
which would be beneficial .... "). 
150. [d. ("The statute does not fix liability on slipshod architects, clumsy engineers, 
poor construction contractors or negligent suppliers of on-the-job training - and the 
fact that [the defendant) may have been all four rolled into one does not change 
matters."). 
151. See, e.g., Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3rd 
Cir. 1988). 
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law doctrine into its analysis. I112 
In 3550 Stevens Creek Associates v. Barclays Bank of Cali-
fornia,1113 the Ninth Circuit cited a building materials exemption 
in CERCLA 1114 to hold a former owner not subject to arranger 
liability based on the sale of a commercial building. lIIII The 
plaintiff claimed a right to contribution for asbestos abatement 
costs incurred subsequent to the sale.lII6 The court held the stat-
utory limitation indicated Congress did not intend to create 
such a cost recovery right. lII7 The Ninth Circuit upheld the 3550 
[d. 
152. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 861 F.2d at 157. 
It is not our function to design rules of liability from the 
ground up ... We are enforcing a statute rather than modify-
ing rules of common law . . . To the point that courts could 
achieve "more" of the legislative objectives by adding to the 
lists of those responsible, it is enough to respond that statutes 
have not only ends but also limits. Born of compromise, laws 
such as CERCLA and SARA do not pursue their ends to their 
logical limits. A court's job is to find and enforce stopping 
points no less than to implement other legislative choices. 
153. 915 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1990) (Pregerson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 111 S. 
Ct. 2014 (1991). 
[d. 
154. Section 104«a)(3)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(3)(B) (West 1989). 
(3) LIMITATIONS ON RESPONSE 
The President shall not provide for a removal or remedial ac-
tion under this section in response to a release or threat of 
release -
(B) from products which are part of the structure or, and re-
sult in exposure within, residential buildings or business or 
community structures; 
155. 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc., 915 F.2d at 1365. 
156. [d. at 1356. 
157. [d. at 1365. The court went on to say, "To recognize a private cause of action 
under Section 107(a)(2) for the voluntary removal of asbestos from a commercial build-
ing would have substantial and far-reaching legal, financial, and practical consequences." 
[d. The court bolstered its decision by quoting an opinion of the Fourth Circuit, First 
United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. United States Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862 (4th 
Cir. 1989): 
To extend CERCLA's strict liability scheme to all past and 
present owners of buildings containing asbestos as well as to 
all persons who manufactured, transported, and installed as-
bestos products into buildings, would be to shift literally bil-
lions of dollars of removal cost liability based on nothing more 
than an improvident interpretation of a statute that Congress 
never intended to apply in this context . . . . 
[d. at 869. The court also made reference to the legislative history of the provision, quot-
ing a senate report, 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc., 915 F.2d at 1364, 
[The Bill] makes clear the exclusion from remedial or removal 
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Stevens Creek Associates rationale in State v. Blech. lli8 In 
Blech, the plaintiff lessee brought an action against the property 
owner to recover the costs of abating asbestos fibers released 
into the building due to a fire. lli9 The Ninth Circuit upheld the 
district court's dismissal of the action citing 3550 Stevens Creek 
Associates and the fact that all of the released hazardous sub-
stance was contained within the building.160 
G. THE EFFECT OF INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS AMONG CERCLA-
LIABLE PARTIES 
Section l07(e) of the Act addresses the issue of indemnifica-
tion or hold harmless agreements between parties: 
(1) No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar 
agreement or conveyance shall be effective to 
transfer from the owner or operator of any vessel 
or facility or from any person who may be liable 
for a release or threat of release under this sec-
tion, to any other person the liability imposed 
action of a release or a threat of a release ... from products 
which are part of the structure of, and result in exposure 
within a facility . . . The Environmental Protection Agency 
has received requests to take removal or remedial action in 
situations where the contamination was from building materi-
als used in the structure and was creating an indoor hazard. 
This section would clarify that such situations are not subject 
to remedial or removal action. 
S.R. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1985), referenced in 4 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD-
MIN. NEWS 2835 (1986). 
158. 976 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1992). 
159. [d. at 526. 
160. [d. at 527. In a footnote, the court cautioned that this holding should not be 
interpreted as suggesting a general exemption from CERCLA liability when the released 
hazardous substance is contained within the facility. [d. at 527 n.2. The Ninth Circuit 
drove home this cautionary note in Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. 
Corp., 976 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992), where CERCLA liability attached to a contractor 
who had moved contaminated soil from one part of a facility to another, uncontaminated 
portion of the same facility. The court stated: 
Whether a transporter moves hazardous material from one 
parcel of land to another, or whether he simply takes the ma-
terial from a contaminated area on one parcel and disposes of 
. it on an uncontaminated area of the same parcel, he has 
spread contamination. There is no logical basis for a defend-
ant's liability as a "transporter" under [42 U.S.C.] section 
9607(a) to hinge solely on whether he moves hazardous sub-
stances across a recognized property boundary. 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem., 976 F.2d at 1343. 
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under this section. Nothing in this subsection 
shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, 
or indemnify a party to such agreement for any 
liability under this section. 
(2) Nothing in this subchapter, including the pro-
visions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, shall 
bar a cause of action that an owner or operator or 
any other person subject to liability under this 
section, or a guarantor, has or would have, by rea-
son of subrogation or otherwise against any 
person.16l 
239 
This "inartfully drafted"162 and "internally inconsistent"163 
provision has caused courts considerable trouble. The ubiquitous 
presence of indemnity agreements in real estate transactions,164 
coupled with the accelerated prominence of claims for contribu-
tion resulting from CERCLA's broad strict liability net/6C1 en-
sures that courts will continue to wrestle with this provision. 
As seems appropriate for so vaguely phrased a statute, 
courts vary in their interpretations. Though recognizing the va-
lidity of indemnity agreements, courts have differed on whether 
protection for CERCLA-like environmental liabilities must be 
expressed explicitly in the agreement.166 
161. Section 107(e); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (West 1989). 
162. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Rop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 
1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom., Jones-Hamilton v. Beazer Materials & Servo 
Inc., 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992). 
163. AM Int'I V. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 528 (N.D. Ohio 
1990). 
164. DiRenzo Pigott & Bereket-Ab, supra note 7, at 1351. 
165. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.13(B). 
166. See generally Hatco Corp. V. W.R. Grace & Co., 801 F. Supp. 1309, 1318 (D. 
N.J. 1992) (requiring that any such agreement must at least make mention that one 
party is assuming environmental-type liabilities to be effective against environmental 
based claims); accord Mobay Corp. V. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345 (D. N.J. 
1991). Hatco recognizes that one party can specifically assume the CERCLA liability 
arising from the indemnitee's actions, but requires "an unmistakable intent to do so 
must be expressed in unambiguous terms or be clearly implied." Hatco, 801 F. Supp. at 
1318. C/. Jones-Hamilton CO. V. Rop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (ac-
cepting a general reference to all federal, state and local laws); Weigrnann & Rose Int'I 
Corp. V. NL Indus., 375 F. Supp. 957 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (holding "as is" to constitute an 
inadequate transfer of liability in a real estate transaction); Chemical Waste Mgmt. V. 
Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (requiring a clear and une-
quivocal reference to CERCLA liability); but see Rodenbeck V. Marathon Petroleum Co., 
742 F. Supp. 1448 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (finding a contractual provision stating that one of 
the parties. "shall be released from all claims and obligations of any character or nature 
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In Mardan Corp. u. C.G.C. Music Ltd.,t67 an interpretation 
of Section 107(e) emerged that is followed by the majority of 
federal courts.168 The Mardan plaintiff purchased a musical in-
strument manufacturing facility from which the seller had al-
lowed hazardous electroplating wastes to drain into a settling 
pond for ten years prior to the. transaction. Following the sale, 
the waste disposal practices continued under the new owner's di-
rection. As part of the transaction, the parties executed an 
"Agreement of General Settlement and Release" (the Release) 
for which the seller paid $995,000. Approximately 22 percent of 
the sum paid was described as addressing outstanding issues be-
tween the parties. The remainder related to "other claims based 
upon, arising out of or in any way relating to the Purchase 
Agreement." After satisfying an EPA abatement order, the pur-
chaser brought a claim for contribution against the seller.169 
The Ninth Circuit held that the parties looked to state law 
for guidance in the formation of their agreement and the court's 
application of state law to the Release did not frustrate the Con-
gressional purpose underlying CERCLA.170 Applying New York 
law, the court found the scope of the Release extended to envi-
ronmental liabilities.17l The Ninth Circuit interpreted Section 
107(e) as negating any right to indemnification in an action 
brought by a governmental agency, but allowed parties to bar-
gain freely to allocate CERCLA liability among themselves. The 
court held such an allocation "tangential" to the enforcement of 
CERCLA because the government was not in any way restricted 
by it.172 The court emphasized that such agreements are, for the 
most part, formed between sophisticated commercial entities of 
equal bargaining power and that to disregard state indemnity 
rules would introduce confusion and uncertainty into commer-
whatsoever arising out of or in connection with said agreements" adequate to effect a 
release from CERCLA contribution claims). 
167. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986). 
168. DiRenzo Pigott & Bereket-Ab, supra note 7, at 1352. 
169. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1456. 
170. [d. at 1459. 
171. [d. at 1457. The Ninth Circuit pointed out that New York law did not recog-
nize mutual mistake as to the extent of injuries, known or unknown, as a basis for invali-
dating commercial contracts in which "general peace" was a consideration of the parties. 
The Ninth Circuit did not address the district court's assertion that the doctrine of "un-
clean hands" provided additional support to the defendant's motion for dismissal. 
172. [d. at 1459. 
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cial transactions.173 
A contrasting interpretation of Section l07(e) is presented 
by AM International v. International Forging Equipment 
(AM!).17" The court held a general release agreement between 
buyer and seller l7ll void and counter to the policies underlying 
CERCLA.176 Basing its interpretation on an exchange between 
two senators,177 the court held that all contractual allocating of 
CERCLA liability between responsible parties is precluded by 
sentence (1) of the Section.178 The AMI court found the refer-
ence to indemnification made in sentence (2) referred only to 
agreements extending liability to parties who would otherwise 
not satisfy Section l07(a)'s statutory definition of "covered per-
sons.1Il79 The district court assessing J-H's claim against Beazer 
173. Id. at 1460. 
174. 743 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ohio 1990). 
175. Id. at 528. AMI agreed to release "any and all [claims] of every kind and 
description, known or unknown, in law or in equity, which AMI now has or may hereaf-
ter have against [the defendants]." 
Id. 
Id. 
176. Id. at 529. 
While the statute's primary policy is the encouragement of 
clean-up initiative on the part of responsible parties, a second-
ary policy is the equitable apportionment of costs in the after-
math. A secondary policy that permitted defenses to contribu-
tion of this kind would undercut the primary policy of 
encouraging clean-up initiative. Parties would be less likely to 
take the initiative if a mutual release were in effect among 
them, since the releas~ would confine the costs to any party 
which acted. 
177. AMI, 743 F. Supp. at 529 (quoting 126 CONGo REc. 30, 984 (1980)). 
Mr. CANNON. Section 107(e)(1) prohibits transfer of lia-
bility from the owner or operator of a facility to other persons 
through indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreements 
or conveyances. Language is also included indicating that this 
prohibition on the transfer of liability does not act as a bar to 
such agreements, in particular to insurance agreements. 
The net effect is to make the parties to such an agree-
ment, which would not have been liable under this section, 
also liable to the degree specified in the agreement. It is my 
understanding that this section is designed to eliminate situa-
tions where the owner or operator of a facility uses its eco-
nomic power to force the transfer of its liability to other per-
sons, as a cost of doing business, thus escaping its liability' 
under the act all together. 
Mr. RANDOLPH. That is correct. 
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described the AMI court's use of the legislative record to inter-
pret Section l07(e) as having "persuasive appeal," but felt com-
pelled to follow Mardan. lso Only one other federal court has ap-
plied the AMI interpretation. lSI The AMI court's "drastic 
departure" from previous decisions has been described by one 
commentator as "transforming CERCLA's remedial purpose 
into a punitive statutory scheme.IIlS2 
The senatorial exchange relied upon in AMI was reap-
praised in Niecko v. Emro Marketing Co. ISS The Niecko court 
criticized AMI's interpretation for failing to distinguish the dif-
ference between a "transfer" versus a "release" of liability.ls4 By 
the Niecko court's interpretation, what Congress intended to 
prohibit was a transfer of liability, whereby the innocent buyer 
assumes all of the seller's pending liability to the government. A 
release of liability, on the other hand, where one liable party 
agrees to assume the liability of another for some bargained for 
consideration, comported with Congressional intent. lslI 
Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co. ISS recognizes that an in-
demnitor can agree to assume the CERCLA liabilities of an in-
demnitee. The court emphasized that public policy concerns ne-
cessitate a strict construction be applied to such an agreement, 
as to any indemnity clause where one party assumes liability for 
the other's acts. But the court found such an arrangement was 
not precluded by CERCLA.lS7 
180. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 
1990), aff'd in part, reu'd in part sub nom., Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & 
Servo Inc., 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. ·1992), reh'g denied, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992). 
181. CPC Int'l v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1282 (W.O. Mich. 1991). 
182. DiRenzo Pigott & Bereket-Ab, supra note 7, at 1355. 
183. 769 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Mich. 1991). 
184. Id. at 990. 
185. Id. at 991. 
186. 801 F. Supp. 1309 (D. N.J. 1992). 
187. Id. at 1317. The court stated: 
[Tlo create a contractual duty of one party to indemnify or 
hold the other harmless from CERCLA-type liability arising 
from that other's acts, an unmistakable intent to do so must 
be expressed in unambiguous terms or be clearly implied. 
Consequently, extrinsic evidence is for the most part irrele-
vant to the issue of the parties' intent ... An agreement will 
either unambiguously express or clearly imply that one party 
will indemnify the other against its own acts giving rise to lia-
bility under CERCLA, or it will not. 
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H. INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW 
California law recognizes that indemnity agreements may be 
expressly stated, implied within a written contract, or arise from 
equities of the particular circumstances.188 Where an indemnifi-
cation duty is expressly contracted for, the scope of obligation 
imposed is determined from the contract without regard to the 
independent doctrine of equitable indemnity.189 Courts construe 
indemnity agreements strictly to assess the parties' intention, as 
reflected in the written document and the circumstances sur-
rounding its execution.190 
Whether the negligent acts of an indemnitee fall within the 
protection of a hold harmless clause has spawned two schools of 
. thought in California. The traditional view distinguished be-
tween "active" and "passive" negligence when' confronted with a 
"general" indemnity clause, namely, one that did not specifically 
address the effect of an indemnitee's negligence.19l Only an in-
demnitee's passive negligence fell within the protection of the 
agreement.192 Active negligence on the indemnitee's part voided 
any protection.193 
Determining whether an indemnitee's conduct constituted 
passive or active negligence was not always obvious. For assess-
ing this question of fact, courts often relied on the indemnitee's 
control and use of the subject property relative to that of the 
indemnitor.194 
The California Supreme Court provided guidance on distin-
Id, at 1318. 
188. Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 532 P.2d 97, 100 (Cal. 1975). 
189. Id.; Markley v. Beagle, 429 P.2d 129 (Cal. 1967). 
190. Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 532 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1975); Indenco, Inc. 
v. Evans, 20 Cal. Rptr. 90 (Cal. App. 1962) .. 
191. Rossmoor, 532 P.2d at 100. 
192. Id. at 101. 
193. Id. 
194. See, e.g., Harvey Mach. Co. v. Hatzel & Buchler, Inc., 353 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1960) 
(holding the owner of a building under renovation to be protected from liability for an 
injury suffered by a contractor's employee when the contractor maintained full control of 
the building); but see Vinnell Co. v. Pacific Elec. R.R. Co., 340 P.2d 604 (Cal. 1959) 
(negating the protection of an indemnity agreement to a railroad where the indemnitee 
maintained full use of the rail yard and injury resulted from the negligent switching of 
rail cars into the yard area under repair). 
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guishing passive from active negligence in Rossmoor Sanitation, 
Inc. v. Pylon, Inc. 1911 Active negligence could consist of acquiesc-
ing in the existence of a dangerous condition created by an-
other.196 Acts constituting passive negligence included failure to 
exercise a right to inspect a contractor's work and failure to ex-
ercise a supervisory right to order the removal of defective mate-
rial. 197 The ambiguity presented by such a standard is reflected 
in Doyle v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph,198 where a Pacific 
Telephone employee's acquiescence in the unsafe road condition 
created by a contractor installing underground conduits and 
manholes was determined to be passive199 despite the nondelega-
ble nature of the duty imposed by local ordinance.2oo A strict 
application of the standards articulated in Rossmoor would hold 
an acquiescence of this nature to be active negligence, thereby 
negating the indemnity protection provided by the agreement.2Ol 
To minimize the ambiguity inherent in the active-passive 
negligence dichotomy, courts developed a second school of inter-
pretation emphasizing the intent of the parties. Intent is re-
flected in the written agreement and the circumstances sur-
rounding its formation. 202 Within this line of reasoning, an act of 
blatant negligence on an indemnitee's part may fall within an 
agreement's protection if the court construes the parties' inten-
tion to so provide.203 
A clear application of this doctrine is found in Schack man 
v. Universal Pictures Company.204 Schackman leased his arcade 
to Universal for filming a scene in a shooting gallery and assured 
Universal that all of the weapons were unloaded. In a suit 
brought by a Universal employee injured when a gun discharged, 
195. 532 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1975). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. 21 Cal. Rptr. 326 (Cal. App. 1962). 
199. Id. at 331. 
200. Id. at '327. 
201. Rossmoor, 532 P.2d at 101 ("Active negligence ... is found when an indemnitee 
has personally participated in an affirmative act of negligence. [or) was connected with 
negligent acts or omissions [of another) by knowledge or acquiescence, or has failed to 
perform a precise duty which the indemnitee had agreed to perform."). 
202. Id. at 103; Schackman v. Universal Pictures Co. Inc., 63 Cal. Rptr. 607 (Cal. 
App. 1967). 
203. Schackman, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 609. 
204. 63 Cal. Rptr. 607 (Cal. App. 1967). 
32
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 16
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/16
1993] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 245 
Schackman cross-complained against Universal for protection 
under a general indemnity agreement. Rather than rely on an 
active-passive negligence standard, the court applied what it 
termed a "realistic" approach to interpret the indemnity agree-
ment.2011 The analysis applied in Schackman extended beyond 
the construction of the document to encompass the risks in-
volved in the arrangement and the likely intention of the parties 
relative to such risks.206 The court cited the obvious nature of 
the risk as a basis for inferring that the parties intended that it 
be included within the agreement's scope.207 The court empha-
sized the modest consideration received by Schackman and the 
fact that Universal drafted the agreement as factors bolstering 
its determination.208 The validity of the Schackman approach 
was upheld by the Supreme Court in Rossmoor,209 where the 
court declared that the active-passive dichotomy was not wholly 
dispositive210 and that the pragmatic approach of assessing the 
parties' intention, as expressed in the agreement, should 
contropll 
California courts commonly include attorneys' fees within 
the costs recoupable under an indemnity agreement.212 The Cali-
fornia Civil Code213 is cited as authority for this policy.2H Courts 
[d. 
205. [d. at 610. 
206. [d. 
207. Schackman, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 611. 
208. [d. 
209. Rossmoor, 532 P.2d at 103. 
210. [d. 
211. [d. at 104. 
While adhering to the underlying distinction between active 
and passive negligence ... the question whether an indemnity 
agreement covers a given case turns primarily on contractual 
interpretation, and it is the intent of the parties as expressed 
in the agreement that should control. When the parties know-
ingly bargain for the protection at issue, the protection should 
be afforded. This requires an inquiry into the circumstances of 
the damage or injury and the language of the contract; of ne-
cessity, each case will turn on its own facts. 
212. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 719 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1983); 
see also County of San Joaquin v. Stockton Swim Club, 117 Cal. Rptr. 300, 303 (Cal. 
App. 1974) (finding the subject lawsuit fell within the scope of a general indemnity 
clause and that the defendant was liable for codefendant's legal expenses). 
213. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2778 (Deering 1986) states in pertinent part: 
(3) An indemnity against claims, or demands, or liability, ex-
pressly or in other equivalent terms, embraces the costs of de-
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have differed, however, in awarding attorneys' fees for appellate 
costs incurred enforcing indemnity rights. 
One line of authority holds that the sole purpose of an in-
demnity clause is to protect the indemnitee against claims 
brought by third parties.2Ui These courts award attorneys' fees 
for appellate procedures only if a right to such is explicitly pro-
vided for in the agreement.216 Courts holding this perspective 
view the awarding of attorneys' fees for appellate costs to be a 
proper subject for negotiation between the parties and are un-
willing to impose such an obligation.217 
A second view emphasizes that awarding reasonable attor-
neys' fees for appellate costs is within the court's discretion.218 
Courts adhering to this viewpoint expend little analysis on the 
matter,219 which has been a focus of criticism from courts apply-
ing the express provision requirement.22o 
[d. 
The Ninth Circuit first took notice of this split in California 
fense against such claims, demands or liability incurred in 
good faith, and in the exercise of a reasonable discretion. 
214. Hillman v. Leland E. Burns, Inc., 257 Cal. Rptr. 535, 540 (Cal: App. 1989); see 
also DeWitt v. Western Pac. R.R. Co.,719 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Thus costs, 
expenses and attorney's fees paid in defense of the claim are included within the amount 
that must be indemnified."). 
215. Hillman, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 541. 
216. See County of San Joaquin v. Stockton Swim Club, 117 Cal. Rptr. 300, 304 
(Cal. App. 1974) ("We prefer to follow the general rule that the defendant in a contract 
suit is not liable for his opponent's attorney fees unless the contract expressly provides 
for it."); see also Doyle v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 21 Cal. Rptr. 326 (Cal. 
App. 1962). 
[d. at 332. 
Pacific requests ... that the court order additional attorney 
fees for services on this appeal. However, the indemnity clause 
only requires Underground to pay the expense of defending 
actions brought by third persons against Pacific, it does not 
provide for any attorneys' fees to be awarded in any action 
between the parties based upon the indemnity agreement. 
217. Hillman v. Leland E. Burns, Inc., 257 Cal. Rptr. 535, 541 (Cal. App. 1989). 
218. Richard v. Degen & Brody, Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 263, 270 (Cal. App. 1960). 
219. See, e.g., Nicholson-Brown, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 133 Cal. Rptr. 159, 166 
(Cal. App. 1976) ("The city requests that ... the trial court be directed to determine the 
amount of attorney's fees to be allowed for this appeal. In cases involving indemnifica-
tion provisions, this has been determined to be the proper procedure."). 
220. See, e.g., County of San Joaquin v. Stockton Swim Club, 117 Cai. Rptr. 300, 
304 (Cal. App. 1974) ("The allowance was made in the Schackman case without any 
discussion. "). 
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authority in DeWitt v. Western Pacific Railroad Co.22l The 
plaintiff in De Witt was a Western Pacific employee injured by 
an unsafe condition created by the indemnitor, the Flintkote 
Company. The Ninth Circuit criticized the express provision 
doctrine applied in Stockton Swim Club as unclear and declared 
its preference for the Schack man approach, awarding the in-
demnitee attorneys' fees for appellate costS.222 In J-H, the court 
felt compelled to follow Dewitt.223 The Ninth Circuit made no 
reference in either case to the discretionary nature of the court's 
authority to make such an award.224 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the decision in Mardan that en-
forcement of an indemnification agreement would not violate 
public policy under CERCLA.22~ As per Mardan, both parties 
remain fully liable to the government but retain the right to 
enter private contractual arrangements allocating CERCLA lia-
bility between themselves.228 The Ninth Circuit upheld the dis-
trict court's application of California law to the indemnity agree-
ment,227 but held the district court erred in granting Beazer's 
summary judgment motion.228 . 
In assessing the indemnity agreement in J-H, the Ninth 
Circuit applied a strict construction.229 Neither party's asserted 
intention was accepted. J-H's argument that the legal protection 
incorporated in the agreement only applied to worker safety 
laws was rejected as an unreasonable interpretation,230 as was 
Beazer's claim of blanket protection.231 The Ninth Circuit held 
221. 719 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1983). 
222. [d. at 1453. 
223. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servo Inc., 959 F.2d 126, 132 n.3 (9th 
Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992). 
224. See Richard v. Degen & Brody, Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 263, 270 (Cal App. 1960) 
("The trial court, if it be so inclined, may allow a reasonable fee for services on appeal.") 
(emphasis original). 
225. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servo Inc., 959 F.2d 126, 129 (9th 
Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992). 
226. [d. 
227. [d. at 130. 
228. [d. 
229. J-H, 959 F.2d at 129. 
230. [d. 
231. [d. at 130. 
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that the agreement applied to all laws, including those relevant 
to environmental quality,282 but extended only to J-H's viola-
tions of these laws, not Beazer's.233 
The level of Beazer's participation in waste disposal re-
mained to be decided and the court held that J-H had offered 
sufficient evidence on this point to preclude a grant of Beazer's 
summary judgment motion.234 The district court's error arose 
from ignoring the limitation of the indemnity agreement's scope 
and disregarding material issues of fact presented by J-H's 
claim.235 
The Ninth Circuit held J-H was entitled to a partial sum-
mary judgment against Beazer for having arranged for the dispo-
sal of hazardous substances as per CERCLA Section 107(a)(3).236 
Citing Aceto237 as authority, the Ninth Circuit agreed that 
CERCLA liability based on an arrangement for the disposal of 
hazardous substances does not require that a chemical supplier 
intend such a disposal. 238 The court felt that to construe the leg-
islation so narrowly would frustrate the Act's goals of making 
companies responsible for the production of hazardous waste 
pay for the cleanup of environmental contamination that is 
likely to result.239 The Ninth Circuit embraced Aceto's pro-
nouncement that courts will look beyond the defendant's char-
acterizations to determine whether a transaction involves an ar-
rangement for the disposal of a hazardous substance.24o 
In further concurrence with Aceto, the Ninth Circuit em-
phasized that the defendant's ownership of the toxic substances 
232. [d. at 129. 
233. [d. at 130. 
234. [d. The agreement provided for a two percent monthly loss of product volume 
through spillage. Such loss would presumably include the hazardous substances for 
which CERCLA liability applied. In addition, J-H employees testified that they relied on 
Beazer's instructions for the handling of Beazer's chemicals and that Beazer's agent had 
been actively involved in the production process. This agent was alleged to have been 
fully aware of and supervised the rinsing of tote bins returned by customers, a process by 
which hazardous substances entered the waste water containment ponds. 
235. [d. 
236. [d. at 131. 
237. United States v Aceto Agric. Chem.Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989). 
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at issue negated, to some extent, the asserted lack of authority 
to control the formulator's operation.241 The Ninth Circuit held 
that the agreement's two percent allowance for spillage consti-
tuted an arrangement for disposal as construed by CERCLA 
Section l07(a)(3),242 and that J-H warranted a summary judg-
ment on this claim.243 
The district court's awarding of attorneys' fees to Beazer 
was partially vacated by the Ninth Circuit. Though approving of 
the district court's application of the Dewitt analysis to the is-
sue, the Ninth Circuit held the awarding of attorneys' fees in 
total was error because the court had not distinguished the 
CERCLA liability Beazer had incurred separately. On remand, 
the district court was ordered to award Beazer attorneys' fees 
for all actions, including the appeal, but only to the extent 
Beazer's potential liability fell within the protection of the in-
demnity agreement with. J_H.244 
V. CRITIQUE 
In attaching liability to Beazer, the Ninth Circuit success-
fully integrated what appear to be diametrically opposed view-
points on the interpretation of a federal law criticized for its 
lack of clarity. J-H reiterates the right first articulated in 
Mardan,246 allowing CERCLA-liable parties to contractually as-
sign liability among themselves, yet incorporates the expanded 
scope of "arranger" liability imposed by the Eighth Circuit in 
Aceto.248 The Ninth Circuit's holding in J-H is a logical progres-
sion in judicial reasoning and is consistent with the results-ori-
ented trend reflected in recent decisions of other courts inter-
preting CERCLA,247 but comports with the logic of Edward 
Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials CO.,248 a Seventh Circuit 
decision based on factual circumstances similar to those of J-H, 
reaching an opposite conclusion. 
241. Id.; see also Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1380. 
242. J-H, 959F.2d at 131. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 132. 
245. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986). 
246. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989). 
247. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3rd Cir. 1992); 
Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992). 
248. 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988), afl'd, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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Courts have long recognized the appropriateness of applying 
common law doctrine to flesh out the ambiguities in 
CERCLA.24e Under common law doctrine, parties engaged in an 
inherently dangerous activity are subject to liability.2l10 The lia-
bility imposed is strict and attaches without regard to a given 
defendant's active control of the enterprise.2111 Legal commenta-
tors discussing the evolutionary development 'of common law an-
ticipate the scope of this enterprise liability doctrine will expand 
beyond that traditionally recognized.2112 Such an expansion is re-
flected in recent court decisions recognizing that a business en-
terprise involving the use of hazardous substances may consti-
tute an abnormally dangerous activity.2113 
249. See generally Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 
(3rd Cir. 1988); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D. Ohio 
1988). 
250. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS, § 71 (5th ed. 
1984). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). Section 520 defines "ab-
normally dangerous activities" by balancing six factors: 
[d. 
[d. 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the 
person, land or chattels of others; 
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be 
great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of rea-
sonable care; 
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common 
usage; 
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it 
is carried on; and 
(f) extent to which its value to the community is out-
weighed by its dangerous attributes. 
251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427A (1984), comment b: 
The principle ... is that one who employs an independent 
contractor to do work which the employer knows or has reason 
to know to involve an abnormally dangerous activity cannot be 
permitted to escape the responsibility for the abnormal danger 
created by the activity which he has set in motion, and so can-
not delegate the responsibility for harm resulting to others to 
the contractor. 
252. W. KEETON ET AL., supra note 250, § 71. 
253. See, e.g., Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1545 (10th Cir. 1992) (recogniz-
ing that the management of hazardous wastes and environmental cleanup actions can 
constitute abnormally dangerous activities subject to strict liability under common law 
doctrine); see also Lisa A. Jensen, The Risk in Defining Risk: Potential Liability of 
Environmental Consultants and Engineers, 23 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1954, (1992) (advanc-
ing the argument that an environmental professional conducting a property assessment 
may be subject to strict liability based on common law doctrine). 
[lIt could be argued that soil boring or other subsurface test-
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Though a purposeful discharge of hazardous substances into 
the environment is a more reprehensible act, contamination aris-
ing from unintentional, accidental spillage is equally detrimental· 
to environmental quality. In recognition of this fact, courts have 
consistently interpreted CERCLA as a strict liability regime.2114 
By not requiring proof of intent to pollute, courts achieve CER-
CLA's primary goals of a timely cleanup of contaminated sites 
with cleanup costs being borne by those responsible for creating 
the problem. 
In Aceto the Eighth Circuit upheld an explicit reliance on 
Section 427A of the Restatement ·(Second) of Torts by a district 
court assigning CERCLA liability to pesticide manufacturers for 
the environmental contamination of a facility used to formulate 
market-grade products.21111 Based on the manufacturers' owner-
ship of the raw materials in addition to the final products, the 
district court had found the formulator was an independent con-
tractor of the manufacturers.2116 In conformity with Section 427 A 
of the Second Restatement, the district court held the manufac-
turers liable for the environmental torts of their independent 
contractor.2117 In addition to these findings, the Eighth Circuit 
concurred with the district court's recognition that environmen-
tal contamination was an inherent risk of the formulation pro-
cess.2118 Aceto holds a party's acquiescence to such a risk consti-
ing that results in the release of hazardous substance is an ab-
normally danger9us activity in situations where the environ-
mental professional knew or reasonably should have known 
that the property was contaminated. For example, where there 
is reason to believe that underground tanks or buried drums 
exist on the property, subsurface testing could be viewed as an 
abnormally dangerous activity under the Restatement of Torts 
analysis. . 
Id. at 1955. But see Michael B. Hingerty, Property Owner Liability for Environmental 
Contamination in California, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 31, 41 (1987) (arguing that the diverse 
range of potential risks posed by hazardous substances precludes a general rule that 
their use can be considered an abnormally dangerous activity per se). 
254. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. N.Y. 
1991), aff'd, 964 F.2d 252 (3rd Cir. 1992); AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743 
F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ohio 1990). 
255. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1382. 
256. Aceto, 699 F. Supp. at 1387. The court stated, "The formulator is more of an 
independent contractor than a purchaser because the manufacturer maintains ownership 
of the technical grade pesticide, the work in progress, and the commercial grade pesti-
cide, even after possession passes to the formulator." Id. 
257. Id. at 1389-90. 
258. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381 (agreeing with the district court, "The generation of 
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tutes an arrangement for the resulting environmental 
contamination, which, in turn, is an arrangement for the dispo-
sal of the hazardous substance contaminants as per CERCLA 
Section 107(a)(3).2&9 
In its opinion, the Eighth Circuit emphasized that the au-
thority to control the pollution-causing process is not the sole 
critical factor in imposing CERCLA liability for resulting envi-
ronmental harm. Rather, the Act specifies ownership of the re-
leased substances as a distinct basis for assigning such 
liability.260 
The Eighth Circuit distinguished its holding in Aceto from 
that of the Eleventh Circuit in Florida Power & Light Co. v. 
Allis Chalmers Corp.,261 where CERCLA liability did not attach. 
Unlike Aceto, Florida Power & Light concerned the disposal of 
hazardous substances at the end of .their commercially useful' 
lifetime, years after their sale by the manufacturer. In the Elev-
enth Circuit case, the manufacturers neither possessed authority 
over the management of the materials nor owned the substances 
ultimately disposed of. Conversely, in Aceto, the disposal acts 
were an inseparable consequence of the transaction, contempo-
raneous with all other aspects of the arrangement.262 
The rationale of Aceto does recognize a distinct and reason-
able limit to the liability CERCLA imposes. The decision does 
not rely on one's having manufactured or introduced a hazard-
ous substance into the stream of commerce as the sole basis for 
imposing CERCLA liability. Aceto therefore meshes readily with 
the decisions of other courts refusing to find an arrangement for 
disposal in commercial transactions involving hazardous 
substances.263 
wastes containing a pesticide through spills, cleaning of equipment, mixing and grading 
operations, production of batches that do not meet specifications and other means, is 
inherent in the formulation process."). 
259. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1382. 
260. Id. 
261. 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990). 
262. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381. 
263. See generally General Elec. Co. v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281 (2d 
Cir. 1992); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 
1990); Jordan v. Southern Wood Piedmont Co., Nos. CV191-108, CV191-063, 1992 WL 
232362 (S.D. Ga. July 14, 1992); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 
F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988); United States v. Westinghouse Elect. Corp., 22 ENVTL. REP. 
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The factual parallels between J-H and Aceto are conspicu-
ous and the Ninth Circuit was correct in citing the Eighth Cir-
cuit case as authority for finding a disposal arrangement in the 
transaction between J-H and Beazer. Beazer retained ownership 
of all the hazardous substances supplied to J-H as well as the 
final formulated products,264 as had the pesticide manufacturers 
in Aceto, rendering J-H an independent contractor of Beazer. 
Presumably, the generation of waste was an inherent component 
of J-H's formulation process and, as these materials were haz-
ardous substances, a degradation of environmental quality was 
thereby likely to result if these wastes were not managed 
properly. 
The Aceto court's rationale would justify finding an ar-
rangement for disposal on these facts alone, regardless of the de-
gree of control exercised by Beazer's agent during the formula-
tion process. But the Ninth Circuit was presented with an even 
stronger basis for finding an arrangement for disposal in J-H, 
the contractual allowance for a two percent loss of material for 
shrinkage and spillage.2611 Were the Ninth Circuit not to impose 
CERCLA liability for such an arrangement, it would necessitate 
a rejection of not only Aceto, but the decisions of other courts 
looking beyond a party's characterization of a transaction to find 
an arrangement for disposal. 266 The Ninth Circuit should receive 
no criticism for refusing to create so unsound a split in the 
circuits. 
The Ninth Circuit's holding also readily resonates with the 
logic applied by the Seventh Circuit in Edward Hines Lumber 
Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co,m the decision seemingly most in 
conflict with the arranger liability imposed by J-H and Aceto. 
Although eschewing the application of common law doctrine to 
CASES (BNA) 1230 (S.O. Ind. 1983). 
264. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Serv., Inc., 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 
1992), reh'g denied, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992). 
265. [d. 
266. See generally Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hopper & Sons, Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th 
Cir. 1992); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. Inc., 810 F.2d 726 
(8th Cir. 1986); Sanford Street Local Oev. Corp. v. Textron, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1218 
(W.O. Mich. 1991); States v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 31 ENVTL. REP. CASES 
(BNA) 1174 (W.O. Pa. 1989); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.O. N.C. 1985); 
United States v. A&F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842 (S.O. Ill. 1984). 
267. 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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the interpretation of CERCLA, the Seventh Circuit did recog-
nize the appropriateness of imposing liability on the supplier of 
a useful chemical product268 if an arrangement for disposal or 
treatment underlies the transaction.269 The rationale of the Sev-
enth Circuit establishes that a defendant's summary judgment 
motion should be denied if the plaintiff offers any evidence that 
the disposal of a hazardous substance was a motivation behind 
the transaction.270 Edward Hines Lumber does not require such 
a disposal arrangement be the sole motivation underlying the 
tra'nsaction for liability to attach. 
The Seventh Circuit's rationale provides strong support for 
the Ninth Circuit's holding, particularly in view of a recent deci-
sion of the Third Circuit. In United States v. Alcan Aluminum 
Corp.,27l the Third Circuit established that there is no de 
minimis level of contamination that must be measured before 
CERCLA liability can be imposed.272 An integration of the logic 
applied by the Third and Seventh Circuits leads to the conclu-
sion that an express provision allowing for a two percent loss of 
material for spillage, as found in the agreement between the par-
ties in J-H, constitutes an arrangement for the disposal of haz-
ardous substances sufficient to warrant, if not the imposition of 
268. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aft'd, 861 F.2d 
155 (7th Cir. 1988). The court stated: 
We reject the defendant's contention that a chemical sold for 
use in a manufacturing process cannot be considered a hazard· 
ous substance for purposes of establishing § 9607 liability. The 
statutory definition of hazardous substance is not so limited, 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14), and the courts have recognized that pri-
mary products may be hazardous substances. 
[d. at 656 nA. 
269. [d. at 654. 
270. [d. at 656 ("[S)ummary judgment for a defendant on CERCLA liability is inap-
propriate when there is some evidence that the motivation behind a transaction was to 
dispose of a waste or by-product."). 
[d. 
271. 755 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. N.Y. 1991), aft'd, 964 F.2d 252 (3rd Cir. 1992). 
272. A/can, 755 F. Supp. at 537. The district court stated: 
[T)he plain statutory language fails to impose any quantita-
tive requirement on the term hazardous substance ... [T)he 
corporate generator, a non-natural person, has added to what 
nature has already seen fit to provide for the continued exis-
tence of various life forms on this planet; that Congress has 
enacted laws to limit, and perhaps limit quite severely, addi-
tions to nature for the sake of the environment and of life on 
this planet seems eminently reasonable. 
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CERCLA liability, at least the denial of a defendant's summary 
judgment motion. 
Like Mardan, J-H upholds the right of parties to freely al-
locate environmental risks among themselves within the frame-
work of their contractual arrangements. Though expressing def-
erence to the logic of AMI, the district court assessing J-H's 
claim applied the Mardan analysis to find indemnity agreements 
between responsible parties did not frustrate CERCLA's pur-
pose.273 Though never mentioning Niecko,274 the Ninth Circuit's 
upholding' of the district court on this issue comports with 
Niecko's alternative interpretation of the legislative history cited 
in AMI.27IS Consequently, the indemnity agreement whereby J-H 
agreed to protect Beazer from liability arising from J-H's viola-
tion of applicable law was upheld on a sound basis. Extending 
the scope of this obligation to include environmental laws not in 
existence at the time of the contract's formation comported with 
general rules of contract interpretation and was consistent with 
the holding of other courts evaluating comparable agreements.276 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit was correct in upholding the dis-
trict court's rejection of J-H's eleventh-hour attempts to impose 
outlandish limitations on the clear wording of the contract. 
The strict construction applied to the agreement by the 
Ninth Circuit is consistent with the treatment state courts have 
traditionally applied to indemnity clauses. In interpreting such 
agreements, California courts look beyond an instrument's word-
ing to discern the parties' intention as reflected in the document 
and the circumstances surrounding its formation. 277 The logic of 
the Ninth Circuit is sound in finding the indemnity provision is 
not reasonably susceptible to the interpretation that J-H in-
tended to assume liability for Beazer's illegal acts. Whether such 
an arrangement, if intended, would survive a challenge based on 
public policy grounds was not addressed in this decision. The J-
H holding does not preclude one party assuming liability for the 
illegal acts of another. The Ninth Circuit simply imposes the 
273, Kop-Coat, 750 F, Supp, at 1026, 
274, Niecko v, Emro Marketing Co" 769 F, Supp, 973 (E.D, Mich, 1991), 
275, [d, at 991. 
276, See, e.g., Hatco Corp. v. W,R. Grace & Co., 801 F, Supp. 1309 (D, N.J. 1992); 
Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc" 761 F. Supp, 345 (D. N.J. 1991). 
277. Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc, v. Pylon, Inc., 532 P,2d 97 (Cal. 1975). 
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reasonable and sensible mandate that any such obligation be ex-
pressed explicitly in the agreement.278 
The weakest aspect of the Ninth Circuit's judgment con-
cerned the awarding of attorneys' fees for costs incurred enforc-
ing indemnity rights. The Ninth Circuit first took note. of split of 
California authority on the issue in Dewitt v. Western Pacific 
Railroad CO.279 and therein chose to follow the line of reasoning 
it found most attractive.280 Though federal courts will view in-
termediate cOlJrt opinions as indicia of the leanings of the state's 
highest court,281 the Ninth Circuit was correct in asserting that 
where a clear split in state authority is manifest, J-H's citing o'f 
a single intermediate court opinion was inadequate to demon-
strate that Dewitt was an improper application of state law.282 
Yet, the court was incorrect in stating it was compelled to follow 
Dewitt and award attorneys' fees. 
What the Ninth Circuit failed to consider in either J-H or 
Dewitt was the discretionary nature of such an award.283 The 
split in authority noted in Dewitt likely reflects a fundamental 
difference in the discretionary standards California courts apply 
to the issue rather than a true difference in doctrine. As such, 
the Ninth Circuit could have awarded such fees in Dewitt while 
withholding them in J-H and comported with California law in 
either case. 
In Dewitt, the Ninth Circuit expressed its preference for the 
approach followed in Schackman v. Universal Pictures Co. 284 
and awarded the indemnitee appellate attorneys' fees. 2811 One 
can only speculate whether the Ninth Circuit's judgment on this 
matter was colored by its having sanctioned Flintkote Company 
for bringing what it considered to be a "frivolous" appeal,288 The 
278. See Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 801 F. Supp. 1309 (D. N.J. 1992) (em-
phasizing the same point with particular reference to CERCLA). 
279. 719 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1983). 
280. [d. at 1453. 
281. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1543 (10th Cir. 1992). 
282. J-H, 959 F.2d at 132 n.3. 
283. Richard v. Degen & Brody, Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 263, 270 (Cal. App. 1960) ("The 
trial court, if it be so inclined, may allow a reasonable fee for services on appeal."). 
284. 63 Cal. Rptr. 607 (Cal. App. 1967). 
285. Dewitt, 719 F.2d at 1453. 
286. [d. at 1451 ("An appeal is frivolous if the result is obvious, or the arguments of 
error are wholly without merit ... The only result of the appeal against DeWitt is to 
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Ninth Circuit's compulsion to follow Dewitt on this matter with-
out regard to the discretionary nature of the court's authority to 
award such fees is the only blemish to an otherwise flawless judi-
cial opinion. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The holding in J-H is consistent with recent decisions of 
other circuits in expanding the environmental liability faced by 
industrial and commercial enterprises. CERCLA, tempered by 
evolving common law doctrine, is the mechanism driving this ex-
pansion. The trend reflected in recent case law may lead to un-
certainty within the industrial community.287 But the prospect 
of such liability will serve to inject environmental considerations 
into many aspects of commercial and industrial transactions 
where, to date, these concerns have been woefully absent. Some 
may criticize this trend as needlessly retarding commercial de-
velopment, but none can argue that it runs counter to the Con-
gressional purpose reflected in CERCLA and the state environ-
mental sister statutes the Act has spawned. 
CERCLA's use of imprecise language to regulate transac-
tions of so complex and technical a nature has made the Act 
difficult for courts to interpret. If the current trend of expanding 
the scope of liability imposed by the Act does not reflect a true 
Congressional objective, the legislative body can readily remedy. 
the situation by either amending the law to more accurately re-
flect its intended design or by withholding future reauthoriza-
tion of CERCLA. Courts, in conjunction with regulated entities 
and their legal counsel, will welcome any clarification of the 
Congressional purpose CERCLA embodies. 
Dennis J. Byrne* 
delay payment of his judgment."). 
287. See Robert C. Goodman, Liability Backs Up The Waste Stream, THE RE-
CORDER, April 6, 1992, at 10. 
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